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I: Introduction 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 initiated many policies to 
address high uninsurance rates and rising healthcare costs. One policy, the health insurance 
exchanges (also called marketplaces), was introduced to facilitate the purchase of qualified health 
plans by individuals not covered by an employer or public program by creating a platform for 
consumers to explore and compare plans. The health insurance exchanges established in 2013 have 
been the subject of media attention, given the various technological problems that have afflicted the 
enrollment processes. However, premiums in these new individual insurance markets have received 
less attention.   
 In this paper, I examine how premiums vary with state involvement in the health insurance 
exchanges through exchange governance, plan management authority, and plan management 
strategy. By better understanding the possible impact of exchange policy variations between states, it 
may be possible to consider what level of state involvement is needed for the health insurance 
exchanges to function optimally. The results of this analysis suggest that states governing their own 
exchanges have lower premiums than partnership or federally facilitated exchanges.    
 
II: Background 
 
The United States has a unique healthcare system based on market principles. In this way, the US is 
very different from the nationalized systems of healthcare common among its peers in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The US is plagued with high 
uninsurance, high healthcare expenditures, and poor health outcomes relative to other OECD 
countries. The ACA was passed to address the growing concerns about the comparatively poor 
health outcomes of Americans and the growth in national health expenditures.  
 
Healthcare Costs 
 In 2011, almost 18 percent of the US economy was generated by the healthcare industry; 
with over $8,500 per capita spent on healthcare annually (OECD, 2013). This figure is 250 percent 
higher than the OECD average of $3,300 (OECD, 2013). More than half of US health expenditures 
are private, whereas the majority of spending in OECD countries is public (OECD, 2013). Despite 
these substantial expenditures, U.S. healthcare outcomes are worse, with lower life expectancy and 
higher rates of obesity and chronic conditions than the OECD average (OECD, 2013).  
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 Since the 1970s the growth in national health expenditures has exceeded growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP). The US Department of Health and Human Services projects that health 
expenditures growth will continue to outpace GDP growth in the next decade, with spending 
comprising 20 percent of GDP by 2022 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013).  
 
Uninsured Americans 
In 2013, there were approximately 48 million non-elderly uninsured Americans, representing 
almost 18 percent of the population (The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 
2013). The majority of these uninsured are not simply experiencing a gap in coverage but have 
lacked health coverage for a year or more (Kaiser Commission, 2013). With the recent recession, the 
number of uninsured increased as individuals lost employment and employers cut benefits.  
Many cannot access affordable health insurance on the private insurance market, citing cost 
as the greatest barrier to coverage (Kaiser Commission, 2013). Only 1.5 percent of uninsured 
Americans choose not to purchase health insurance because they do not think they need coverage. 
By contrast, approximately one in three uninsured Americans say they do not have health insurance 
because they cannot afford the premiums (Kaiser Commission, 2013).  
The consequences of lacking health coverage have been well documented as detrimental to 
individuals and communities. One in four adults without health coverage forgoes necessary medical 
care each year due to the costs; the uninsured population overall is less likely to receive preventive 
care or to receive treatment for chronic conditions (Kaiser Commission, 2013). Overall those 
without health coverage tend to have worse health status than those with health coverage as they 
lack the means to diagnose early and treat conditions effectively, leading to higher mortality rates 
(Kaiser Commission, 2013).  
 
Affordable Care Act 
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in part to address the high uninsured 
rate and unsustainable growth in national health expenditures. The ACA implemented several 
measures including: (1) the individual mandate stating that individuals (and some employers) must 
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, (2) expansion of the Medicaid program to cover a wider 
population of low income adults and children, and (3) the health insurance exchanges to reform the 
individual insurance market.   
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The individual mandate works to incentivize those without insurance to purchase health 
insurance, or apply for public coverage if eligible, by imposing a financial penalty (based on income) 
if individuals cannot prove health coverage status. The Medicaid expansion, made optional by a 
2012 Supreme Court ruling, allows states to expand their Medicaid programs with federal funding to 
cover all children regardless of income and all adults with income below 138 percent of the federal 
poverty line. Despite these measures, policy makers perceived that with these measures alone health 
coverage would still not be accessible to the entire population, thus the creation of the health 
insurance exchanges. 
   
Health Insurance Exchanges 
 Health insurance exchanges were created to facilitate the purchase of qualified health plans 
and to distribute premium subsidies based on income for individuals and families. The exchanges 
were intended to be implemented by each state, but states had the choice of opting for a federally 
facilitated exchange or partnership exchange. The exchanges function as portals that present health 
coverage options to individuals based on their geographic location and income; it is the new portal 
for Medicaid enrollment as well as private insurance options.   
Plans are grouped into metal levels (bronze, silver, gold, and platinum) to standardize and 
simplify the presentation of plans to consumers. The metal levels indicate how much coverage a 
plan offers consumers, taking into account variations in deductible, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket 
maximum. Bronze plans offer 60 percent actuarial coverage, meaning between deductibles co-
insurance and premiums the consumer will shoulder 40 percent with insurer responsible for 60 
percent. The actuarial value of silver plans is 70 percent, gold is 80 percent, and platinum is 90 
percent. The federal subsidies are pegged to the cost of the second lowest cost silver plan.  These 
subsides are available to those making less than 400 percent of the federal poverty line.   
 There is considerable variation between states in exchange implementation. Seventeen states 
chose to develop their own exchange, seven states chose to create a partnership exchange, and the 
remaining 27 states defaulted control to the federal government in developing and implementing the 
exchange. Exchange governance responsibilities include establishing a governance body to 
manage the exchange, creating the online portal for consumers, formulating a method of raising 
revenue to fund the exchange in the future, and encouraging enrollment through a marketing 
campaign and customer assistance.  
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 Plan management authority is controlled at the state level by seven states with federally 
facilitated exchange governance, and by all partnership and state exchanges for a total of 31 states 
with plan management authority and 20 states where the federal government has plan management 
authority. Plan management for the exchanges means approving qualified health plans and 
interacting with issuers about premiums. Variation also is present in plan management strategy, 
with most states (41) simply acting as a clearinghouse and accepting all plans that meet their criteria. 
Ten states chose to act as active purchasers—taking a more hands-on approach to working with 
health plan issuers in the state and negotiating premiums, networks, and benefits for plans sold in 
the exchange. Table 1 and Figure 1 present these three variations of state involvement. 
 States are divided into rating areas, ranging from a single state-wide rating area in smaller 
states to 67 in Florida. In total, there are 501 rating area across the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Insurers in each state can decide to participate in some or all rating areas. To participate 
in a rating area, insurers must offer at least one silver and one gold plan. These health plans must at 
minimum meet the essential health benefits laid out in the federal requirements.   
 
Table 1: State Choice in Exchange Involvement 
 
Greater  State Involvement  Less 
Exchange 
Governance: 
State (17) Partnership (7) Federal (27) 
Plan Management 
Authority: 
State (31) Federal (20) 
Plan Management 
Strategy: 
Active Purchaser (10) Clearinghouse (41) 
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Figure 1: State Choice in Exchange Involvement 
 
 
 
Exchange Governance 
State-based exchange 
Federally facilitated exchange 
Plan Management Authority 
State plan management 
Federal plan management 
Plan Management Strategy 
Active Purchaser 
Clearinghouse 
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III: Literature Review  
 
Managed competition provides the theoretical underpinnings for the ACA’s health insurance 
exchanges. Regulating the health insurance market has historically been a state responsibility. 
Although federal regulations are increasingly forcing state action, states still maintain considerable 
autonomy in regulating state insurance markets. The health insurance exchanges of the ACA are no 
different. Certain basic regulations apply to all state marketplaces but allow states a range of policy 
choices within these federal guidelines. The role that states play as regulators in the exchanges is 
essential to the success of these marketplaces.   
 
The Need for Regulation in the Individual Health Insurance Market 
Adverse selection, the actions resulting from asymmetry of information between consumers 
and insurers, is one of the greatest problems in the health insurance market. Healthy individuals tend 
to abstain from purchasing insurance or purchase low value insurance, while high risk or less healthy 
individuals purchase more insurance coverage. When consumers purchase coverage according to 
their personal need and preference, the insurance market becomes destabilized; when insurers take 
on an increasingly riskier and sicker beneficiary pool, they must raise premiums to account for the 
sicker population. Beneficiaries on the margins of finding value in health insurance will drop their 
coverage as premiums increase beyond what is valuable for them as individuals. This process results 
in market failure as premiums become astronomically expensive because only the sickest, highest-
cost individuals remain in the risk pool.  
Adverse selection in an unregulated market can produce market failure. If only low risk 
individuals drop insurance coverage, this results in higher premiums for those who remain in the 
market. Eventually the increasing premiums push all but the catastrophically sick out of the 
insurance market. In reaction to adverse selection of consumers, insurers utilize their own risk 
selection, by trying to minimize entry of high risk individuals into their risk pools and by attracting 
low risk individuals through marketing, underwriting, and benefits designs. These actions by insurers 
result in inequitable coverage, a characteristic of the individual market pre-ACA, in which high-risk 
individuals could be charged higher premiums than low-risk individuals, and those with preexisting 
conditions could be denied coverage entirely. 
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Managed Competition as Basis for Creation of Health Insurance Exchanges 
 Managed competition is a concept developed by Alain Enthoven during the 1970s and 1980s 
as a reaction to these problems inherent in the health insurance market. Managed competition 
centers on how a sponsor of the market, such as a government, can work as a regulator to institute a 
structure and process to manage the health insurance market (Enthoven, 1988). Enthoven argues 
that with appropriate management, the government can encourage competition on price, quality, 
and consumer satisfaction, the result being a better healthcare system (Enthoven, 1988).  
 Within managed competition, consumers choose a plan from the regulated market and 
insurers work within their own processes (such as contracting with healthcare providers) to promote 
efficiency. It is essential that the sponsor of the market is more than a just a passive regulator, but 
actively engage to meet the needs of the market in order to address the risk associated with adverse 
selection. The sponsor must work with all necessary stakeholders and be responsive and engaged in 
managing the market actively though constant oversight and awareness. With regards to the 
exchanges as outlined in the ACA, it is unclear if there is an advantage in creating a competitive 
marketplace for active state involvement compared to active federal involvement.  
 A key criticism of the Enthoven model is the ability of governments to effectively reach a 
happy medium of regulation and prevent health plans from circumnavigating the regulatory 
framework (Hughes Tuohy, 1999). If governments over-regulate, the market will turn into a uniform 
arena where all health plans are essentially the same and charge the same price—resulting in loss of 
innovation and motivation by health plans to increase efficiency (Sipkoff, 2003). If governments 
under-regulate, there is the potential for the health insurance market to take on many of the possible 
adverse features, destabilizing the market and resulting in a market failure. 
 Another criticism questions the ability for consumers to choose from between plans in a way 
that promotes efficiency and competition. Consumers must have reasonable understanding of health 
insurance in order to choose wisely from among the various plans, and some studies doubt the 
ability of consumers to make wise choices, with market inertia eventually taking over and limiting 
competition as consumers stick with the status quo of their current coverage for simplicity’s sake 
(Sofaer, 1993). Both of these criticisms indicate the importance of an effective regulator.  
 
Regulating for Managed Competition in the ACA 
According to Enthoven, the market sponsor must establish an effective framework: 
“establishing rules of equity, selecting plans, managing the enrollment process, creating price-
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elasticity demand, and managing risk selection” (Enthoven, 1993). The impacts of ineffective 
regulation will result in a failed market at worst or in less severe cases resulting in an inability of 
managed competition to reduce prices or improve quality.  
The authority to regulate the insurance market falls on two levels: state and federal. At the 
federal level, the ACA mandates certain market regulations and dictates the range of state policy 
decisions by setting general guidelines (Greaney, 2010). The states have the ability to make policy 
choices within this federally determined range.  
The ACA addresses many issues of risk in the insurance market uniformly across states. In 
order to promote broader insurance coverage, the ACA limits the tools that insurers have used to 
manage their risk pools. The ACA limits experience rating, a tool insurers use to adjust premiums 
and plans to the risk of the beneficiary but which generates inequity among beneficiaries. Also, new 
regulations require that individuals are offered insurance regardless of pre-existing conditions. On 
the other hand, the individual mandate works to encourage healthy individuals to enter the 
individual health insurance market, thus creating a healthier risk pool, although they have the option 
of paying the penalty rather than paying for insurance. Including a range of risk among beneficiaries 
is essential for insurers and for market stability, given new constraints in their ability price according 
to individual beneficiary risk (Blumberg & Pollitz, 2009). Additionally some literature has found that 
larger markets result in lower premiums, due to economies of scale (Greaney, 2010).  
The ACA also sets the medical loss ratio (MLR) at 80 percent, meaning that 80 percent of 
the premiums paid must go to medical care, and the remaining 20 percent can be allocated for 
administrative purposes. The ACA’s impact of medical loss ratio regulation in the individual market 
will have an uncertain effect on premiums; although premiums may decrease as a result, insurers 
could meet the MLR requirement through other means, such as reducing administrative costs 
(Abraham & Karaca-Mandic, 2011). This regulation will also disparately impact states, as states had a 
variety of MLR regulations pre-ACA. Therefore in some states, insurers have already been following 
the ACA’s MLR regulation.  
Overall, a greater burden of risk falls on the insurer under the ACA; although the individual 
mandate will help to expand the risk pool to include a healthier beneficiary population, the ACA also 
limits use of strategies that the insurance industry previously used to manage risks. These various 
regulations implemented across all states at the federal level heighten the importance of the state role 
in managing the individual insurance market.   
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State Choice in Regulating Exchanges to Promote Competition 
 Prior to the ACA, Blumberg and Pollitz (2009) foresaw that exchanges would require a 
strong market regulator to manage risk, enroll beneficiaries, and encourage cost containment; 
extrapolating to the present conditions, any responsibilities that are not outlined in the ACA will 
either fall to the state or will default to federal control. This flexibility in state policy choice could be 
essential in ensuring the effectiveness of an exchange as a competitive marketplace. 
 Greaney (2010) takes a comprehensive look at the role of state in regulating these exchanges, 
and emphasizes the need to provide insurers with tools that minimize risk in order to remain 
solvent. He points to many aspects of regulation under state control that may increase or decrease 
competition, with a focus on the necessity of the state to regulate the individual market outside the 
exchange as well as the market within the exchange; without which high and low risk pools may 
gravitate to different markets, impacting premiums and competitiveness (Greaney, 2010). The choice 
of a state to take on the role of an active purchaser is also important to Greaney in mitigating the 
effects of adverse selection by increasing competition among insurers. But, it is important to note 
that regulations will impact market competitiveness differently across states since each state has a 
different insurance market, each with a different level of competition among insurers. These 
“variations in markets, cultures, and state regulations will necessitate individualized 
approaches”(Greaney, 2010). Although Greaney is not commenting on the possible impact of a state 
control of the exchange, it seems logical that a state would be better at meeting the unique needs of 
its own insurance market than would the blanket regulations of the federal government. 
State involvement in the exchange could improve negotiation with the insurers and efforts to 
recruit new insurers to participate in the exchange, resulting in lower premiums (Corlette & Volk, 
2011). On the other hand, higher state involvement could entail greater control over the insurers, 
additional certification criteria and requirements on product choices, and greater efforts to tailor 
policies to the need of the state’s population. Such additional requirements may result in higher 
premiums (Corlette & Volk, 2011). 
In theory, policy choices that keep the state actively involved in managing the market 
indicate a greater involvement in the exchange and a greater state commitment to creating a 
competitive marketplace. Dash, Monahan, and Lucia (2013) note that in the past states that 
attempted to establish an exchange were hindered by challenges in addressing adverse selection and 
enrolling enough beneficiaries to create a competitive marketplace.  States conducting their own plan 
management may have an advantage in addressing adverse selection in the market, as they will be 
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able to apply consistent oversight to all plans available in the individual market, offered both within 
and outside the exchange (Dash, Monahan, & Lucia, 2013).   
Prior to the exchange implementation, insurers and brokers advocated for the clearinghouse 
strategy, arguing that a larger pool of insurers and plans would improve competition and result in 
lower premiums, while other stakeholders claimed an active purchaser strategy  has greater potential 
to negotiate lower premiums (Cantor et al., 2011).  It is not clear whether the active purchaser or the 
clearinghouse model will promote greater competition. 
Higher levels of state involvement in the exchanges could suggest that these states can better 
coordinate meeting the needs of various the stakeholders, monitor local markets, and take measures 
to avoid adverse selection. It could also mean more burdensome regulation that increases premiums. 
This paper will examine if, states with an active role in the exchanges are better able to meet the 
needs of the market and promote a greater degree of competition as measured by lower premiums 
compared to states that did not ‘opt-in’ to engage in the exchanges.  
  
Impacting Premiums Though State Regulation 
 Literature examining how state regulations in insurance markets have impacted premiums is 
also helpful in understanding the impact of state involvement in insurance markets. Two studies in 
particular are relevant: (1) Pauly and Herring (2007) consider the impact of state regulations on 
premiums in the individual insurance market before the ACA and (1) Blavin et al. (2012) simulate 
the impact of state policy choices in the ACA on premiums. 
 Pauly and Herring (2007) find that rate regulations, requirements that insurers justify rate 
increases to state regulators, had little impact on premiums and coverage in the pre-ACA market. 
Although the impact observed was small, such regulations were associated with lower premiums 
among high risk populations but were also associated with a higher number of uninsured individuals. 
This study is measuring the impact of an actual policy, not the impact of a general idea of a state 
actively managing a market. The Pauly and Herring study may indicate that greater controls on 
insurers, including regulations specified in the ACA and policy options available to states, will reduce 
premiums, albeit with tradeoffs. The tradeoff, a greater uninsured population, will likely be less 
drastic under the ACA, between encouragement to purchase coverage from the individual mandate 
and subsidies available in the market.    
Blavin et al (2012) test the potential that state policy choice in the small group market will 
impact cost and enrollment by simulating ACA policy choices, in particular considering age banding 
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policies. They find that the impact of a state’s choice in reducing or eliminating age banding from 
the federally set default depends on age of the policy holder. Blavin et al found that premiums for 
young adults increased, and while premium subsidies will insulate many individuals from these 
increases, fewer young people will seek insurance. By contrast, with age banding older non-elderly 
adults will have lower premiums and enrollment of this age demographic increases (Blavin, et al, 
2012).  As a result of this, and other findings in the simulation, Blavin et al suggest that state policy 
choices in exchanges will only have a small impact on the cost and enrollment.  
Both these studies find that there are tradeoffs in premiums and enrollment that occur with 
regulation. At the same time, Blavin et al and Pauly and Herring find that there are generally small 
changes in premiums and uninsured rates from regulation. From these analyses, it is difficult to infer 
how regulation of the exchanges will impact premiums.  
   
Individuals as Consumers of Healthcare 
 The role of individuals will also have an important role in determining premiums in the 
health insurance exchanges. Because managed competition is essentially selling health plans directly 
to a consumer, the role of consumers is key to making managed competition work.  
In his view of managed competition, Enthoven  (1988) states that the lowest price health 
plan should be subsidized for all individuals, and consumers who wish to purchase more generous 
coverage should have to pay the difference themselves. This, in theory, means that a consumer will 
value the additional benefits of coverage enough to purchase those benefits—increasing their price 
sensitivity relative to a standard set of benefits and creating a benchmark from which they can 
measure the added value of more generous benefits. The health insurance exchanges, as outlined by 
the ACA, offer subsides for individuals and families up to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Line 
which are pegged to the second lowest cost silver plan. These subsidies will equalize the premiums 
across bronze and the lowest and second lowest cost silver plans, but price sensitivity exists among 
more generous plans which cost more than the second lowest silver plan.  
Experiences in the Netherlands’ health insurance exchange, where market inertia has been 
detrimental to competition, also indicate that consumer behavior is important to competition. 
Market inertia is present when individuals remain with the same plan because potential price or 
quality gains are not perceived to be worth the hassle of switching to a new plan. In 2011, when 
premiums rose more than usual, a greater number of individuals switched plans, citing raising 
premiums as the main reason. Although this indicates some price sensitivity, those who considered 
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switching choose not to switch despite premium increases because there was no discernable 
difference in quality of care (Brabers, Rooijen, & Jong, 2012). Learning from the Dutch experience, 
it will be important to consider the possible effects of state policy choices in the exchanges on 
market inertia and thus on competition within the individual market as more years of enrollment and 
premiums data become available.  
States will have an important responsibility in providing information to create informed 
consumers: choosing what plan information to show and how it is relevant to the consumers’ 
decision making process. States will also have a role in consumer education initiatives to raise 
awareness, encourage enrollment, and educate on how health plans work. The success of states in 
engaging consumers in the health insurance market may impact premiums in the long run, but as 
this is the first enrollment period under the health insurance exchanges, this factor will not likely 
impact premiums yet. Discerning this effect will be an important consideration of later analyses.  
 
IV: Data 
 
Because the health insurance exchanges are the product of a newly implemented policy, few analyses 
have been conducted on the health insurance exchanges, and currently no existing analyses use the 
rating areas as the observation level. As a result, I compiled a variety of data sources on the state and 
county level. The final dataset consists of 501 observations representing each rating area across the 
50 states and District of Columbia.  
 
Premiums and Exchange Characteristics  
The outcome of interest, monthly premiums, was collected for each rating area based on the 
premiums for a 29 year old earning more than 400 percent of the federal poverty line (greater than 
$45,960). The income threshold was chosen in order to access the unsubsidized premium rates. The 
age of 29 was chosen to represent the young adult demographic, between the ages 25 and 34, which 
has the highest rates of uninsurance of all Americans.†  
Information on plans, including premiums, was gathered from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services for the 34 federally facilitated and partnership exchanges (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2013). For the 17 state-run exchanges, premiums and 
                                                          
†
 The age of 29 years old represents the middle of the young adult age range, and an age still eligible to enroll in a 
catastrophic plan. Catastrophic plans are only available to individuals under 30 and have a lower actuarial value than 
bronze plans. Final analysis did not include analysis of catastrophic plans, but data was collected with that intention.   
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plan information was gathered from state exchange consumer websites or publicly available state 
government documents. Coinsurance, deductible, and out-of-pocket maximums for all exchanges 
were collected from ValuePenguin, a website that has collected all premiums information from the 
exchanges (ValuePenguin.com, 2013). See Appendix A for further details and specific sources for all 
variables. 
Variables indicating state policy choices regarding the exchange governance, plan 
management authority, and plan management techniques were created using information gathered 
from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the National Conference of State Legislatures. These 
variables were then combined to create a series of dummy variables that indicate all possible 
combinations of these three policy choices, discussed further in the next section.  
 
Population Characteristics 
Demographic, economic, and health information are important for controlling observable 
variation between state and rating area level observations that may affect premiums independently of 
state exchange policies. This data was available at the county level, from County Health Rankings 
2010, and aggregated to rating area level (County Health Rankings & Roadmaps, 2011). Important 
variables gathered from this source include indicators of health risk: fair or poor health status, 
prevalence of diabetes, prevalence of obesity, and prevalence of low birth weight births; insurers will 
consider these characteristics that indicate the health risk of a population when setting premiums. 
Other characteristics gathered include household income, per capita medical costs, and 
unemployment rate. State level characteristics were also available from this data source. These 
variables are important for controlling variations in economic characteristics that may affect the cost 
of health care in a rating area or state.  
 
Healthcare Market Characteristics  
Characteristics of the state insurance market regulation, in particular rate review and medical 
loss ratio, are important indicators of state regulation of the insurance market before the ACA’s 
implementation. The rate review process of the state can vary from simply monitoring premium rate 
increases to an active review process that requires insurers to annually justify premiums (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). The medical loss ratio (MLR) also indicates extent to which 
a state was active in regulating the individual insurance market prior to the ACA (America’s Health 
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Insurance Plans, 2010). Variables in the dataset indicate whether or not a state used prior approval as 
rate review strategy and the level the MLR was set for the individual market.   
The Medicaid fee index provides an indicator of how fee-for-service reimbursement rates 
vary between states by illustrating state variations from the national mean. Although states set 
Medicaid rates, this variable will help act as a measure of healthcare costs uncoupled from the state’s 
health status (Zuckerman & Goin, 2012).   
Another measure of healthcare costs, state level premiums data from the individual health 
insurance market before the implementation of the exchanges, were collected from two sources. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which provided minimum and median premiums in 
each state from 2013 for a variety of demographic groups, including 30 year old men and women 
with deductible, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximum (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2013). There were a few missing values among the deductible and coinsurance which were left as 
missing. The Manhattan Institute created a weighted state average of premiums for 2013 based on 
the 5 lowest cost plans in the most populous zip code of each county for a 27 year old (Manhattan 
Institute, 2013).  
Also included as an independent variable is a variable indicating if a state recommended a 
plan from the exchange to act as the essential health benefit benchmark. This indicates if a state 
recommended a plan with essential health benefits (EHB) beyond those prescribed by the ACA.  In 
order to cover these additional benefits insurers may need to increase premiums in these states 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013).  
Hospital market power is a key influence on premium determination and varies widely by 
community. The most widely used measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI), calculated by the squared sum of hospital market share, which is measured by dividing 
the hospitals staffed beds by the total staffed beds in the market. This measure was calculated using 
data from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health (see appendix for details). Market share is an important 
determinant of premiums because insurers must negotiate reimbursement rates with providers and 
the actor with greater leverage—such as market power—will have greater ability to determine 
reimbursement (Greaney, 2010). 
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V: Methodology  
 
The statistical analysis consists of two models. First, an OLS model with relevant covariates, such as 
health, demographic, and insurance market characteristics, helps to control for various 
heterogeneous characteristics between states and rating areas. Second, using pooled premiums as the 
outcome of interest with the same covariates as the OLS model helps to address heterogeneity, and 
increases power of the model.  
 
Defining Treatment Variables 
 As can be seen in Figure 2, there are seven possible combinations of state choices regarding 
exchange governance, plan management authority, and plan management strategy. States occupy 5 
of these groups, as only a small number of states chose active purchaser for their plan management 
strategy. The 5 exclusive groups of exchange types are presented in Figure 2: (1) State-based 
exchanges with state plan management and active purchaser for plan management  (1-SSA); (2) 
State-based exchanges with state authority of plan management and clearinghouse for plan 
management  (2-SSC); (3) Partnership exchanges with state authority and clearinghouse for plan 
management  (3-PSC); (4) Federally facilitated exchanges with state authority and clearinghouse for 
plan management; and (4-FSC); (5) Federally facilitated exchanges with federal authority and 
clearinghouse for plan management (5-FFC).  
 States can first choose their exchange governance (state-based, partnership, and federally 
facilitated). Federally facilitated and partnership exchanges can then choose either to conduct their 
own plan management or to leave that responsibility to the federal government, and all state based 
exchanges conduct their own plan management automatically. Any state with plan management 
authority can either choose to be an active purchaser or a clearinghouse; all exchanges with federal 
plan management have clearinghouse as their plan management strategy.  
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Figure 2: Treatment Variable Categorization of State Participation in Exchanges 
 
Observations:       
State 101 7 0 7 0 7 20 
Rating Area 67 39 0 56 0 52 287 
Treatment 1-SSA 2-SSC  3-PSC  4-FSC 5-FFC 
 
Model 1: OLS Regressions 
Use of covariates in the OLS regressions addresses variations across states, such as health 
status, market size, and regulatory environment. These observable features vary by state and rating 
area and may be related with both the premiums and the treatment status of a state. Controlling for 
these observable characteristics will allow the model to examine the difference in premiums by 
treatment status while holding constant the variation in premiums that occurs with these 
characteristics. The model is specified as follows: 
 
            
      
 
Y : One model for each outcome of interest: 
 Monthly premium of lowest cost bronze plan  
 Monthly premium of lowest cost silver plan  
 Monthly of lowest cost gold plan 
 Monthly of second lowest cost silver plan 
Z : Treatment Variables 
 Exchange type as described in Figure 2 (1-SSA, 2-SSC, 3-PSC, 4-FSC, and 5-FFC) 
X’ : Covariates‡ 
 Number qualified health plans by metal level of plan Y in the rating area (2014) 
 Total number of qualified health plans in rating area (2014) 
 Deductible of Plan Y(2014) 
                                                          
‡ See Appendix B for variable definitions and data sources. 
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 Coinsurance of Plan Y (2014) 
 Out-of-pocket maximum of Plan Y (2014) 
 Statewide number of insurers participating in exchange (2014) 
 Total number of insurers participating exchange in rating area (2014) 
 State recommended Essential Health Benefits (EHB) benchmark plan to HHS, (2012-
2013), 1=state recommended EHB 
 Rating area percent of population living in rural area (2010) 
 Rating area percent unemployed (2010), % 
 Rating area per capita medical costs (2010), $ 
 Rating area percent uninsured (2010), % 
 Rating area population (2010) 
 Rating area percent over 65 years old (2010), % 
 Rating area percent under 18 years old (2010), % 
 Rating area percent African American (2010), % 
 Rating area percent Hispanic (2010), % 
 Rating area percent white non-Hispanic (2010), % 
 Rating area percent other non-Hispanic (2010), % 
 Rating area low birth weight prevalence (2010), % 
 Rating area diabetes prevalence (2010), % 
 Rating area obesity prevalence (2010), % 
 Rating area percent with fair/poor health (2010), % 
 Rating area hospital market power unconcentrated (2010), 1=unconcentrated 
 Rating area hospital market power moderately concentrated (2010), 1=moderately 
concentrated 
 State had prior approval for rate increases pre-ACA (2010), 1=prior approval 
 State mean premiums from before ACA (2013), $ 
 State Medicaid fee index all services (2012), >1 indicates higher than average Medicaid fees 
 State governor Democrat (2010-2012), 1=Democrat 
 
  
Model 2: Pooled Premiums Regression 
The second model adopted makes use of pooled premiums and includes a variety of 
covariates to control for observed variations across states and ratings areas that may also impact 
premiums. By running a pooled premium regression rather than four separate regressions, one for 
the premium levels in the dataset, Model 2 maintains power otherwise lost by running multiple 
regressions and is better able to fit the reality of how premiums are set. If the variance in premiums 
across exchanges is different across the various plan types (bronze, silver, gold) this model will have 
large standard errors, but if the variance is the same the standard errors will be more efficient than in 
Model 1.  
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Use of the pooled model means all covariates will have the same coefficients across all plan 
types, rather than four different estimates, if the impact of state policy decisions on premiums was 
estimated separately for each plan type. In reality, insurers are setting premiums for all the plans they 
offer at the same time, and will account for unique characteristics of the market similarly across all 
plans they offer. The pooled regression is thus more appropriate as state and rating area 
characteristics should consistently influence the premiums for all plans offered in the exchanges.   
The covariates included in this model are the same as Model 1, and address variations across 
states and premiums, such as health status, market size, and regulatory environment. As with Model 
1, controlling for these observable characteristics will allow the model to determine the difference in 
premiums that exists between treatment categories while holding constant the variation in premiums 
that occurs due to these characteristics. Model 2 is specified as follows: 
 
                        
      
 
Y : Outcome of Interest 
 Premiums—each rating area has four premium observations (lowest bronze, lowest silver, 
second lowest silver, and lowest gold) 
Z : Treatment Variables 
 Exchange type as described in Figure 2 (1-SSA, 2-SSC, 3-PSC, 4-FSC, and 5-FFC) 
 : Plan Type 
 Describing the plan type of the premium observation—lowest bronze, lowest silver, 
second lowest silver, or lowest gold 
    : Plan Type * Treatment Variables 
 Interaction of the plan type and exchange type treatment variable 
X’ : Covariates 
 Same as Model 1 covariates 
 
  
VI: Descriptive Statistics 
 
State Demographic Characteristics 
Table 2 presents the mean baseline characteristics for selected state characteristics. Political 
and policy measures, such as party of the governor and state choice on Medicaid expansion, vary 
considerably between all treatment groups. Democratic governors and choosing to expand Medicaid 
are more common among states with more active participation in the exchanges. Other observable 
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differences are clear across treatment categories in most other characteristics. States with a more 
active role in the exchanges tend to be healthier, with lower rates of obesity and better self-reported 
health status. While there are differences in indicators of health status, the differences between states 
are less drastic than the differences on policy choices. All these differences indicate that selection 
bias is present, as each state made a different combination of policy choices with regards to the 
exchanges. These choices were based on a variety of different characteristics, some of which can be 
observed, including the variables in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Mean Baseline State Characteristics by Treatment Group 
  
All 
States 
1-SSA 2-SSC 3-PSC 4-FAC 5-FFC 
Observations 51 10 7 7 7 20 
State Population 5,966,428 8,400,324  3,191,620  4,617,238  3,837,044  6,938,164  
Medicaid Expansion 51.0% 100.0% 85.7% 85.7% 14.3% 15.0% 
Democratic Governor 39.2% 80.0% 71.4% 71.4% 14.3% 5.0% 
Uninsured Rate 14.2% 14.4% 13.5% 14.2% 13.3% 14.6% 
Per Capita Income  $39,468   $43,213   $43,332   $37,401   $38,378   $37,349  
Unemployment Rate 8.8% 9.9% 8.5% 8.5% 7.0% 8.9% 
Under 18 23.4% 22.5% 23.2% 22.8% 23.4% 24.3% 
Over  65 13.5% 13.6% 12.8% 14.5% 14.2% 13.1% 
African American 10.9% 8.9% 9.4% 10.3% 6.4% 14.3% 
Hispanic 10.8% 14.5% 16.3% 6.4% 5.6% 10.5% 
Non-Hispanic White 70.4% 68.8% 58.1% 78.9% 81.6% 68.7% 
Female 50.7% 50.9% 50.5% 50.9% 50.5% 50.6% 
Rural 25.9% 18.7% 16.7% 32.1% 35.4% 27.3% 
Obesity 27.9% 25.8% 23.9% 29.8% 28.6% 29.4% 
Low Birth Weight 8.1% 7.8% 8.0% 8.3% 7.4% 8.6% 
Diabetic 9.1% 8.5% 7.6% 9.8% 8.9% 9.7% 
Fair or Poor Health Status 14.9% 14.6% 13.5% 15.1% 13.0% 16.1% 
Per Capita Medical Costs  $ 9,014  $9,015   $7,813  $9,184   $8,624   $9,511  
Household Income $50,823  $55,375    $54,126  $49,545 $49,309  $48,369  
Prior Approval Authority 70.6% 90.0% 85.7% 85.7% 71.4% 50.0% 
Mean Lowest Premium 
Pre-ACA 
 $149   $190   $143   $124   $137  $144  
Medicaid Fee Index 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 
Recommended EHB 52.9% 100.0% 71.4% 71.4% 28.6% 25.0% 
Insurers with Greater than 
5% Marketshare 
4.2 5.9 3.9 3.4 3.4 4.0 
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Describing Premiums  
As is seen in Figure 3, the mean lowest premium in each plan category varies by no more 
than $30 dollars across the five state policy choices. States fully responsible for the exchange (1-SSA) 
and states with no involvement in the exchange (5-FFC) have the highest premiums, while those 
with middling engagement in the exchanges have the lowest premiums. Overall there is no clear 
relationship between the extent to which a state in involved in the exchange and the premium levels.   
1-SSA, representing states that choose the most active participation in the exchange have the 
highest premiums in each premium category. The difference between 1-SSA premiums and the 
other categorizations of state policy choices is statistically significant across all premium levels. See 
Tables 9-12 in Appendix B for a complete listing of differences in premiums and statistical 
significance. The states with no participation in the exchanges, indicated by 5-FFC, have the second 
highest premiums. Premiums for 5-FFC states are significantly different when compared to all other 
treatments groups but 4-FSC. The mean premiums for 2-SSC and 3-PSC are almost identical, 
indicating that the variation between state and partnership governance may be minimal.  
Also of importance to the pooled regression model is homogenous variance across plan 
types. From Figure 3, it appears as though there similar relationship between each the premium 
levels across the treatment categories. This supports use of a single pooled premium regression over 
four separate regressions.  
 
Figure 1: Average Monthly Premiums by State Engagement in Exchanges 
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VII: Results 
 
My analysis took two stages: Model 1—OLS regressions using a variety of covariates as controls, 
and Model 2—a pooled premium regression using the same covariates as Model 1. These models 
illustrate how state policy decisions to participate in exchanges may impact the premiums of 29 year 
olds, using the rating area as the observation level. Full results are available in Appendix C.  
 
Model 1: OLS with covariates 
As can be seen in Table 3, the OLS model results indicate that only states governing their 
own exchange and plan management with a clearinghouse model (2-SSC) have statistically lower 
premiums than states with complete federal control of their exchange (5-FFC). Holding all else 
constant, states in the 2-SSC group had premiums $22 to $43 lower than states which allowed the 
federal authorities to take full control of their exchange (5-FFC). These 2-SSC states also have the 
lowest premiums of all states. In general, the coefficients of this model indicate that any state control 
in the exchanges results in lower premiums compared with all federally controlled exchange, but the 
relationships are not statistically significant.  See Table 3 for summarized results.  
 
Table 3: Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on Premiums Compared to 5-FFC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plan 
     
1-SSA -11.64 -12.11 -5.25 -30.64*** 
2-SSC -22.84*** -29.59*** -22.21** -43.41*** 
3-PSC -1.28 2.91 -1.18 -9.89 
4-FSC -9.50* -7.18 -3.96 -11.16 
     
R2 .4466 .4999 .5016 .5057 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
The comparison between 2-SSC, 3-PSC, and 4-FSC states indicates that the governance 
strategy does have a significant effect on with premiums, as that is the unique policy identifier of 
these three treatment categories. States in the 2-SSC category, with state exchanges, have 
significantly lower premiums than partnership exchanges and federally facilitated exchanges which 
also have state plan management authority using the clearinghouse strategy (3-PSC and 4-FSC). 
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States with state-based exchanges have premiums ranging from $22 to $34 lower compared to 
partnership exchanges and $23 to $43 lower compared to federally facilitated exchanges. See results 
in Table 16 in Appendix C. Comparing partnership and federally facilitated exchanges though, there 
is no indication that states with partnership governance have lower premiums than states with 
federally-facilitated exchanges.   
Although there appears to be a relationship between premiums and state-based exchange 
governance, this OLS model does not lend strong support to the hypothesis that states with greater 
engagement in the exchanges will see lower premiums. The results for this model are obtained by 
running four separate regressions, where each distinct level of premiums is considered a separate 
outcome of interest. As a result, this model has less power than the pooled regression I perform in 
Model 2. 
 
Model 2: Pooled Premiums Regression 
With the pooled premiums model, I only run one regression compared with the four 
regressions in Model 1. Comparing the adjusted R2 of the models reflects the improvement in fit. 
The adjusted R2 for the four regressions in Model 1 fell between 0.44 and 0.51, while for the pooled 
premiums model the adjusted R2 is 0.62, meaning the pooled premium model explains more of the 
variation in premiums between treatment categories.  
Premiums compared to reference category (5-FFC). 
States that have no responsibility in the exchange, categorized by 5-FFC, act as a reference 
category against which the other categories measure the impact of the varied levels of state choice to 
be actively engaged in the exchange on premiums. As in Model 1, 2-SSC states have the lowest 
premiums compared to all other treatment categories as demonstrated in Table 4. For almost every 
plan level there is a statistically significant difference between premiums for states that chose to 
govern their own exchange and plan management (1-SSA and 2-SSC) compared to states that took 
no responsibility for their exchange (5-FFC). States that chose a state-based exchange have 
premiums between $18 and $35 lower than the states with no responsibility for their exchange (5-
FFC). The partnership and federal exchanges have lower premiums than the entirely federally run 
exchanges (5-FFC), but the differences are not statistically significant. Additionally, it is important to 
note that 1-SSA states have the second lowest premiums; this is a dramatic change from the means 
comparison when this group of states had the highest premiums. See Table 4 for summarized 
results.  
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Table 3: Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on Premiums Compared to 5-FFC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plan 
     
1-SSA -17.90** -19.12** -3.44 -17.15** 
2-SSC -25.81*** -30.73*** -27.99*** -35.12*** 
3-PSC -1.49 -2.71  1.54 -6.14 
4-FSC -4.31 -11.01** -7.93 -8.33 
     
R2 0.6227    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Governance Strategy. 
Comparing states in the 2-SSC, 3-PSC, and 4-FSC treatment categories allows a direct 
comparison of governance by holding the constant plan management authority and strategy. State-
based exchanges have significantly lower premiums than partnership and federal exchanges, holding 
constant the covariates, plan management authority, and plan management strategy. Premiums are 
$24 to $30 lower in state-based exchanges compared to partnership exchanges, and $20 to $27 lower 
compared to federally-facilitated exchanges. There is no statistical difference in premiums between 
states with partnership and federally-facilitated exchanges. See Table 5 for summarized results. 
 
Table 5: Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on Premiums Compared To 4-FSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plan 
     
2-SSC -21.49*** -19.72** -20.07** -26.78*** 
3-PSC 2.82 8.30 9.47 2.19 
     
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Plan management Authority.  
 A comparison of 4-FSC and 5-FFC provides a direct comparison of plan management 
authority by holding constant federally facilitated exchange and clearinghouse plan management. 
There is no conclusive evidence of a relationship between plan management authority and premiums 
based on this analysis. As can be seen in Table 4, states with state plan management authority have 
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lower premiums than states with federal plan management authority, but this relationship is not 
significant apart from the lowest cost silver plan.  
Plan management strategy.  
There is no statistically significant difference in premium between 1-SSC and 2-SSA states, 
which indicates there may be little relationship between premiums and plan management strategy. 
Holding plan management authority and exchange governance constant, bronze and silver 
premiums are not significantly different when plan management strategy varies between 
clearinghouse and active purchaser. For the second lowest cost silver and lowest cost gold plans, 
states with an active purchasing strategy have significantly higher premiums, between $18 and $25. 
This is not conclusive evidence that there is a relationship between plan management strategy and 
premiums. See Table 6 for summarized results. 
 
Table 6: Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on Premiums Compared to 2-SSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plan 
     
1-SSA 7.90 11.61 24.56*** 17.96** 
     
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
VIII: Limitations 
 
The results of this study are intended to provide a preliminary understanding of how state 
engagement in the exchanges impacts premiums, but not a definitive answer as the data and 
methodology have been restricted by resource constraints. Preliminarily, it appears as though states 
that are more engaged in their exchanges, particularly through exchange governance, tend to have 
lower premiums than states that default to federal control.  
 
Data Limitations 
As a newly implemented policy, there are no datasets with all relevant variables collected 
with the rating area as observation level. While collecting relevant variables, adjustments had to be 
made to data, such as taking a weighted average of county level data to create a rating area level 
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observation. These adjustments further open the analysis to error as a result of miscalculations in 
creating the dataset.  
Data on insurance premiums, deductibles, co-insurance, and out-of-pocket maximums are 
gathered from a variety of sources and from databases such as valuepenguin.com. While this is the 
best data currently available, there may be a lack of consistency across sources, such as in the 
definition of co-insurance or deductibles, as health insurance plans generally have a variety of rules 
in each plan (such as copays versus co insurance and different payments for in- and out-of-network 
providers). Despite the possibility of inconsistencies in the data, this should not impact the analysis 
greatly.  
Given that only cross-sectional data is currently available at the rating area level, statistical 
methods for analyzing the impact of state involvement in the exchanges on premiums are limited.  
After accumulating more years of data, further analysis can be conducted with more rigorous 
methodologies.  
Using five treatment categories also decreased the number of observations in each category, 
relative to a binary treatment category. By dividing states by multiple levels of policy choices, this 
analysis loses power in the sample size, with as few as 39 rating area level observations in a single 
treatment category. Changing treatment categories to indicate fewer policy choices, such as testing 
exchange governance alone, may increase the power of the model by increasing the number of 
observations in each of three treatment categories. This would be less theoretically robust by 
equating states that are not directly comparable, ignoring other state policy choices such as plan 
management authority that may also impact premiums.  
 
Methodological Limitations 
The pooled premium regression maintains power of the dataset by determining within a 
single model how premiums at all four plan levels varied with regards to policy choices and 
controlling variables. The model assumes that premiums are normally distributed. After testing the 
distribution of premiums, it is clear that these are not normally distributed. This is a problem for the 
pooled premium model that may be addressed through improvements to the model. Despite the 
concerns of violating the assumption of normal distribution, these results still provide valuable 
insight into the relationship between state participation in exchanges and premiums given the 
similarity between the OLS and pooled regression results, and the improvements in fit of the pooled 
results over OLS results.  
27 
 
The greatest threat to the soundness of these results is my inability to address selection bias 
at this time. Because states made choices regarding how they interact with the exchanges, there are 
observable and unobservable characteristics which may be related both to individual market health 
insurance premiums and state choice regarding the exchanges. While this study does control for 
many observable differences (for example, political party of the governor and previous state 
regulations of the individual market), unobservable heterogeneity (for example, unmeasurable 
cultural differences) is still present and unaccounted for in this model.   
Due to selection bias, the results from these models are not necessarily causal, but rather 
they represent observed differences adjusted for some important observable characteristics. This 
study does not make claims of causality based on results, but can report that these differences in 
premiums exist and are real either due to exchange participation or a set of characteristics which 
influence premiums. The exchange participation treatment categories are observable variation 
resulting from these unobservable differences, and still is representative of a difference between 
these states and exchanges.   
This study considered other methods to correct for selection bias, but they were 
insufficiently robust to provide meaningful analysis. A difference-in-differences analysis was 
considered, but not on a rating area level, thus losing considerable variation from within the states. 
The premiums from the pre-ACA period were not directly comparable to the premiums in the post 
implementation period as a result of the introduction of rating area level markets with the ACA. As 
a result, the difference-in-differences approach was not an appropriate method for determining the 
relationship between premiums and state policy choices. Future analyses should be conducted using 
difference in difference analysis as states change their governance and plan management strategies.   
Another option to better address the selection problem is to find and use an instrumental 
variable (IV) to proxy for the treatment and to avoid selection bias. Although a few options 
appeared to be potential IVs for this analysis, none were strong in the first stage (F statistics<10) 
and they were theoretically weak.  Additionally, use of IV only be able to proxy for a single, binary 
level of state policy choice, resulting in general results not directly applicable to the specific policy 
choices of states. 
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IX: Discussion & Policy Implications 
 
Despite the limitations on the study, the results still can inform policymakers’ understanding of the 
exchanges and the role of states in implementing and governing the exchanges, especially as no 
other study has yet analyzed how the variation in state policies has impacted premium. The strength 
of this study is its timeliness in shedding light on a little understood policy with many stakeholders 
and interested observers. 
The results of this and future research on the topic may impact the states’ interaction with 
respect to governance and plan management of the exchange. From this analysis, there is evidence 
suggesting that state-based exchanges have significantly lower premiums than federal or partnership 
exchanges. Given this information, states and the federal government could consider creating a path 
for federally facilitated exchanges and partnership exchanges to convert to a state-based exchange. 
Given time, incentives, and capacity building it may be possible for all states to voluntarily make this 
change. There is no evidence currently that the plan management authority is important in reducing 
premiums. Additionally there is inconclusive evidence that clearinghouse plan management strategy 
results in lower premiums compared to states with active purchaser plan management. 
A direct application of these results may be found in the example of Minnesota’s exchange 
MNsure. Minnesota is a state based exchange with clearinghouse plan management run by the state 
during this first enrollment cycle, or 2-SSC—the group of states with the lowest premiums overall. 
MNsure authorities have considered moving from a clearinghouse strategy toward that of an active 
purchaser. Given the results of this study, that change in plan management strategy may not impact 
premiums significantly, and in fact could result in higher premiums.  The MNsure authorities should 
consider their reasons for switching from clearinghouse to active purchaser to assess if that change 
in plan management strategy meets their goals, whether the goal is reducing premiums or providing 
better consumer protections through closer monitoring of insurers and plans.  
Although it appears as though state engagement in exchanges is beneficial to lowering 
premiums, this may be due to unobservable characteristics. If a state is forced to become responsible 
for the exchange or if they are in some way unprepared for the responsibility, (for instance if a state 
does not have the resources or expertise in the matter), it is likely that the federal government, with 
its resources and experience, then would be a better choice to manage these responsibilities. This 
analysis does not speak to the comparable quality of policymaking and implementation of the states 
versus the federal government. Nor does this speak to the political environment that plays an 
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important role in how states interact with the ACA. Since each state is unique it is possible that in 
some cases the federal government is currently able to do a better job in effectively regulating the 
exchange to keep premiums low. As such, this may provide impetus to build states’ desire and ability 
to become more effective regulators. 
 
Prospect of Reducing Health Expenditures by Reducing Premiums 
The magnitude of the results is also important on an individual and societal level, if 
confirmed by other analyses. Statistically significant results hovered around a $25 difference in 
monthly premiums between state and federal exchanges, meaning individuals who do not qualify for 
subsidies could save $300 annually on premiums. At a societal level, regardless if an individual 
qualifies for subsidies, these premiums will be paid into the healthcare system. Using the CBO 
projected enrollment of approximately 5 million individuals living in states with federal and 
partnership exchanges, and assuming everyone is a 29 year old, this $300 annual savings per person 
would save the nation about $1.5 billion annually in national health expenditures. Although this 
calculation does not reflect real cost savings, it conveys the idea that reducing premiums through 
competition fostered by state engagement in regulation can reduce national health expenditures 
substantially.   
 
Future Analyses 
Policy briefs on the health insurance exchanges have generally used a single premium per 
state, whether that is an average or lowest across the state; those analyses lack accuracy by neglecting 
to account for the full range of premiums as they vary by rating area within states. This study 
includes premiums and characteristics from all ratings areas, meaning this variation is accounted for 
in this analysis. This should help set a precedent for using the more accurate rating area level as the 
observation level in future studies.  
Policy briefs on the topic thus far have typically compared premiums directly across states. 
This gives an inaccurate view of premiums, because premiums are impacted by different state and 
rating area characteristics.  Even if the analysis presented in this paper is not completely accurate due 
to the inability to address the selection problem effectively, the progression of results shows the 
extent to which the comparison of mean premiums is misleading and the value of controlling for 
observable characteristics.   
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A similar study should be conducted to see if enrollment numbers vary with these state 
policy choices, since reducing the uninsured populations is another goal of the exchanges. 
Disparities between states’ ability to enroll their uninsured populations may support or repudiate the 
findings of this study.  
There is potential for this study, and follow up studies, to impact state and federal policy 
surrounding the health insurance exchanges and insurance markets. The exchanges are a novel 
concept in American healthcare that have not been studied and are generally not well understood. 
This study helps to shed light on the impact of the varieties of governance and participation at play 
across the various exchanges.   
 
X: Conclusion 
 
Health insurance exchanges, as established by the ACA, are not well understood in practice as few 
functioning examples exist. Studying the new state health insurance exchanges is important to ensure 
they are an effective strategy in remedying insurance coverage, health expenditure, and health 
outcomes problems that they were intended to help address. This study focuses on understanding 
how state policy choices pertaining to their active participation in the exchanges are related to 
insurance premiums. The results of this analysis suggest that increased states governing their own 
exchanges have lower premiums than partnership or federally facilitated exchanges. There was no 
conclusive evidence to indicate that state policy choices on plan management authority and plan 
management strategy were associated with premiums. These results are preliminary given the data 
and methodological limitations, but they provide a valuable starting point for considering how 
exchanges can encourage lower premiums.  
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Appendix A: Treatment Variables 
 
Table 4: State Involvement in Exchange 
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Appendix B: Data 
Variables Type, Units, Year Source 
Exchanges Variables: 
  
Premiums Dollar, 2014 
ASPE-all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
state exchange websites-most 
state exchanges 
valuepenguin.com-Kentucky 
and Hawaii 
Plan deductible Dollar, 2014 
State Exchange websites-
available state exchanges 
ValuePenguin- all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
Plan coinsurance Percent insurer covers, 2014 
State Exchange websites-
available state exchanges 
ValuePenguin- all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
Plan out of pocket maximum Dollar, 2014 
State Exchange websites-
available state exchanges 
ValuePenguin- all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
Number of metal level qualified 
health plans in the rating area 
Count, 2014 
ASPE-all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
state exchange websites-most 
state exchanges 
valuepenguin.com-Kentucky 
and Hawaii 
Total number of qualified health 
plans in rating area  
Count, 2014 
ASPE-all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
state exchange websites-most 
state exchanges 
valuepenguin.com-Kentucky 
and Hawaii 
Total number of insurers 
participating in exchange 
statewide 
Count, 2014 
ASPE-all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
state exchange websites-most 
state exchanges 
valuepenguin.com-Kentucky 
and Hawaii 
Total number of insurers 
participating exchange in rating 
area 
Count ,2014 
ASPE-all federal and 
partnership exchanges 
state exchange websites-most 
state exchanges 
valuepenguin.com-Kentucky 
and Hawaii 
Recommended Essential Health 
Benefits (EHB) benchmark plan 
to HHS 
Binary, 1=State recommended 
EHB, 2012 
Kaiser Family Foundation 
(KFF) 
Rating Area Characteristics: 
  
Rating Area Population Count, 2010 County Health Rankings 
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Female Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Under 18 Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Over 65 Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
African American  Percent, 2011 County Health Rankings 
Non-Hispanic White Percent, 2012 County Health Rankings 
Uninsured rate  Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Percent unemployed  Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Percent of population living in 
rural area  
Dollar, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Per capita medical costs in 
rating area 
Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Percent of births low birth 
weight  
Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Percent Fair/Poor Health Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Obesity prevalence Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Diabetes prevalence  Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Hospital market power (HHI by 
category) 
1-3, 1=concentrated, 
2=concentrated, 3=highly 
concentrated, 2010 
Dartmouth Atlas (see note 
below for calculation) 
State Characteristics: 
  
Party of governor making 
exchange choice 
1=Democrat, 2010-2013 KFF 
State had prior approval for rate 
increases pre-ACA 
Binary, 1=prior approval, 2011 NCSL, KFF 
MLR 
Binary, 1=met NAIC standard, 
2012  
NCSL 
Mean premiums 2013 Dollar, 2013 Manhattan Institute 
Minimum premiums 2013 Dollar, 2013 GAO 
Minimum Premium Deductible Dollar, 2013 GAO 
Mimimum Premium 
Coinsurance 
Percent insurer covers, 2013 GAO 
Mimimum Premium Out of 
Pocket Maximum 
Dollar, 2013 GAO 
State Medicaid fee index, all 
services 
State index to national mean of 
1, all services, 2012 
KFF 
Insurers statewide with greater 
than 5% market share 
Count, 2011 KFF 
Projected Enrollment  Count, 2013 CBO 
State per capita income Dollar, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Unemployment rate Percentage, 2010, 2013 BLS 
Uninsured rate Percentage, 2010, 2013 Census 
Population Count, 2010, 2013 Census 
Female Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Under 18 Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Over 65 Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
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African American  Percent, 2011 County Health Rankings 
Non-Hispanic Qhite Percent, 2012 County Health Rankings 
Uninsured rate  Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Percent unemployed  Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Percent of population living in 
rural area  
Dollars, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Per capita medical costs in 
rating area 
Percent, 2010 County Health Rankings 
Percent of births low birth 
weight  
Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Percent Fair/Poor Health Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Obesity prevalence Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
Diabetes prevalence  Percent, 2010, 2013 County Health Rankings 
 
The HHI measure is only useful if it is measuring a meaningful market. In the case of hospitals, two 
main geographic boundaries are used to delineate the market.  Metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) 
are general measures of a metropolitan areas bounded by the edge of the suburban area.  HRRs 
provide a more meaningful measure of hospital market as they were developed using the geographic 
dispersion of hospital patients, grouped around hospital needs. Given this, the MSA region is an 
inadequate measure of hospital markets because the HRRs were created to represent hospital 
markets. Although HRRs (and MSAs) do not align well with the rating areas, it is a meaningful 
market that can be vaguely fit to the rating area level to approximate the type of market 
concentration that is facing insurers trying to offer plans in those markets through the exchanges.  
 
Another disagreement when calculating HHI measure is how to define a hospital.  Many hospitals 
are not run independently but in large systems that can span large geographic areas or with many in 
a single market. Given we are calculating market share, it makes sense to count hospitals owned by 
the same group as comprising a single market share because competition between these hospitals is 
nonexistent, especially when considering provider contracting with insurers. I chose to limit the 
definition of market share to hospitals with the same owners within HRR.  
 
Traditionally HHI for hospitals is calculated by the number of staffed beds.  Given time and 
resource limitations as well as the dearth of publicly available data about hospitals nationwide, it was 
necessary to find unique sources that can be adapted. The data that included all necessary variables 
was found at the Dartmouth Atlas, aggregated from Medicare data for the years 2008-2010.  
Specifically the data measures End of Life for Medicare Beneficiaries with chronic conditions. The 
dataset includes HRR, individual hospitals, and hospital system. The dataset though lacked 
information on staffed beds.  Instead I chose to use assigned Medicare patients; this is a measure 
that represents share of market by representing the capacity of the hospital.  While there are 
problems with this measure, such as selection bias toward hospitals with better outcomes for 
chronic conditions, these patients are assigned, so selection bias by the individuals is not fully 
present.  
 
In the end, I calculated an HHI measure for hospitals at the HRR level to define the market. 
Individual hospitals in systems were aggregated with other hospitals within the same system in the 
same HRR.  Market share was calculated by comparing the number of assigned Medicare 
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beneficiaries for hospitals/systems within an HRR to the total number of assigned patients squared 
then summed. Given the constraints in calculating an accurate HHI measure, I was able to assess the  
adequacy of my estimates by comparing the nationwide range of market power to other published 
sources. 
 
As is seen in table C, the newly calculated HHI measure falls between two other measures, indicating 
that it will serve as an adequate proxy of hospital market concentration for this analysis despite the 
unorthodox methods used.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of National Hospital Market Power 
 My Measure 
(HRR) 
Harvard 
(HRR) 
AHIP 
(MSA) 
Unconcentrated 13.8 % 19.0 % 6.6 % 
Moderately Concentrated 23.0 % 32.0 % 13.1 % 
Highly Concentrated 63.2 % 49.0 % 80.3 % 
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Table 9: Difference in Mean Premiums for Lowest Cost Bronze 
Plans 
 
1-SSA   2-SSC   3-PSC   4-FAC   5-FFC  
1-SSA 0 
 
               
2-SSC -$26.59 *** 0 
 
           
3-PSC -$23.97 *** $2.62 
 
0 
 
       
4-FAC -$12.45 * $14.14 * $11.52  * 0 
 
   
5-FFC -$5.71   $20.88 *** $18.27  *** $6.75  0  
          
 
Table 10:  Difference in Mean Premiums for Lowest Cost Silver 
Plans 
 
1-SSA   2-SSC   3-PSC   4-FAC   5-FFC  
1-SSA 0 
 
               
2-SSC -$35.43 *** 0 
 
           
3-PSC -$33.52 *** $1.91 
 
0 
 
       
4-FAC -$24.75 *** $10.68 
 
$8.77  * 0 
 
   
5-FFC -$16.75   $18.68 *** $16.78  *** $8.00   0  
 
         
 
Table 11:  Difference in Mean Premiums for Second Lowest Cost Silver Plans 
 
1-SSA   2-SSC   3-PSC   4-FAC   5-FFC  
1-SSA 0                  
2-SSC -$48.66 *** 0 
 
           
3-PSC -$43.18 *** $5.47 
 
0 
 
       
4-FAC -$36.53 *** $12.12 
 
$6.65 
 
0 
 
   
5-FFC -$29.04 *** $19.62 *** $14.14 ** $7.49   0  
          
 
Table 12:  Difference in Mean Premiums for Lowest Cost Gold 
Plans 
 
1-SSA   2-SSC   3-PSC   4-FAC   5-FFC  
1-SSA 0                  
2-SSC -$39.13 *** 0 
 
           
3-PSC -$33.73 *** -$5.40 
 
0 
 
       
4-FAC -$22.08 ** $17.05 
 
$11.65 
 
0 
 
   
5-FFC -$14.16 * $24.97 *** $19.57 ** $7.92  0  
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix C: Full Regression Results 
Table 13: Model 1 OLS Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 5-FFC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
     
1-SSA -11.64 -12.11 -5.25 -30.64*** 
2-SSC -22.84*** -29.59*** -22.21** -43.41*** 
3-PSC -1.28  2.91 -1.18 -9.89 
4-FSC -9.50* -7.18 -3.96 -11.16 
     
Deductible 0.002 -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.016*** 
Coinsurance 11.34 -38.21** -88.40*** -78.45*** 
Out-of-pocket Maximum 0.007 -0.004* 0.009*** -0.002 
Number of Insurers in Rating Area -6.95*** -7.8671*** -7.7453*** -9.9730*** 
Unconcentrated Hospital -3.54 -4.6797 -4.8942 -5.8055 
Moderately Concentrated Hospital 2.69 -1.1862 -0.5075 -3.1956 
Rating Area Rural 30.14*** 27.7571*** 25.8855*** 34.9857*** 
Rating Area Unemployed 366.88*** 409.5348*** 357.8573*** 532.3291*** 
Rating Area Per Capita Medical Costs -0.003** -0.0045** -0.0019 -0.0060*** 
Rating Area Household Income 0.0005* 0.0009*** 0.0004 0.0012*** 
Rating Area Uninsured Rate 152.86*** 235.30*** 218.93*** 254.37*** 
Rating Area Population 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rating Area Under 18 -120.20 -214.85** -124.61 -250.17** 
Rating Area Over 65 Years -16.92 -73.15 -61.61 -121.19 
Rating Area Hispanic 11.59 -4.43 -14.76 -4.57 
Rating Area African American 190 2.56 -0.44 -24.94 
Rating Area Asian 11.08 20.78 49.20 20.91 
Rating Area Non-Hispanic Other -56.71* -28.75 -60.39* -39.16 
Rating Area Low Birth Weight 133.90 247.87 273.50 266.99 
Rating Area Diabetic -321.43 -370.12* -591.10*** -466.59* 
Rating Area Obese 9.93 51.30 67.73 105.41 
Rating Area Fair/Poor Health Status -79.50 -51.66 -57.70 -79.83 
Democratic Governor -21.30*** -11.16** -10.37* -18.43*** 
Prior Approval on Rate Review -11.03*** -17.91*** -10.87** -16.03*** 
Mean Lowest Premiums Pre-ACA 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 
Medicaid Physician Fee Index 26.03*** 18.82** 19.34** 19.28** 
State Recommended EHB 9.70** 14.27*** 16.66*** 14.07** 
Medicaid Expansion 7.58 2.65 5.86 10.86 
Constant 90.53* 237.81*** 187.23*** 283.13*** 
     
R2 0.4647 0.4901 0.4992 0.4936 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 14: Model 1 OLS Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 4-FSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -2.14 -4.94 -1.28 -19.48* 
2-SSC -13.34 -22.41** -18.24** -32.26*** 
3-PSC 8.22 10.08 2.79 1.27 
5-FFC 9.50* 7.18 3.96 11.16 
     
R2 0.4647 0.4901 0.4992 0.4936 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 15: Model 1 OLS Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 3-PSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -10.3602 -15.0170** -4.0686 -20.7565** 
2-SSC -21.5682*** -32.4923*** -21.0314** -33.5283*** 
4-FSC -8.2243 -10.0815 -2.7872 -1.273 
5-FFC 1.2752 -2.9059 1.1772 9.8855 
     
R2 0.4647 0.4901 0.4992 0.4936 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 16: Model 1 OLS Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 2-SSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA 11.208 17.4753** 16.9627** 12.7718 
3-PSC 21.5682*** 32.4923*** 21.0314** 33.5283*** 
4-FSC 13.3439 22.4108** 18.2442** 32.2553*** 
5-FFC 22.8434*** 29.5864*** 22.2086** 43.4138*** 
     
R2 0.4647 0.4901 0.4992 0.4936 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 17: Model 1 OLS Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 1-SSA, 2014 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -11.208 -17.4753** -16.9627** -12.7718 
3-PSC 10.3602 15.0170** 4.0686 20.7565** 
4-FSC 2.1359 4.9355 1.2814 19.4835* 
5-FFC 11.6354 12.1111 5.2459 30.6420*** 
     
R2 0.4647 0.4901 0.4992 0.4936 
N 501 501 501 501 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 18: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared to 5-FFC, 2014 
 
Coefficient 
Exchange Type 
1-SSA -17.9015*** 
2-SSC -25.8055*** 
3-PSC -1.4873 
4-FSC -4.3084 
  
Plan Type 
 
Lowest Silver 33.0825*** 
Second Lowest Silver 38.8685*** 
Lowest Gold 64.9734*** 
  
Exchange Type*Plan Type 
1-SSA*Silver -1.22 
1-SSA* 2nd Silver 14.46** 
1-SSA* Gold 0.75 
2-SSC *Silver -4.92 
2-SSC * 2nd Silver -2.19 
2-SSC* Gold -9.31 
3-PSC *Silver -1.22 
3-PSC * 2nd Silver 3.03 
3-PSC* Gold -4.65 
4-FSC *Silver -6.70 
4-FSC * 2nd Silver -3.62 
4-FSC* Gold -4.02 
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Deductible -0.007*** 
Coinsurance -38.48*** 
Out-of-pocket Maximum 0.001 
Number of Insurers in Rating Area -7.94*** 
Unconcentrated Hospital -4.07* 
Moderately Concentrated Hospital -0.82 
Rating Area Rural 30.76*** 
Rating Area Unemployed 419.43*** 
Rating Area Per Capita Medical Costs -0.004*** 
Rating Area Household Income 0.001*** 
Rating Area Uninsured Rate 194.55*** 
Rating Area Population 0.000 
Rating Area Under 18 -158.45*** 
Rating Area Over 65 Years -74.59** 
Rating Area Hispanic 2.73 
Rating Area African American -11.02 
Rating Area Asian 40.07 
Rating Area Non-Hispanic Other -52.99*** 
Rating Area Low Birth Weight 214.03** 
Rating Area Diabetic -433.92*** 
Rating Area Obese 61.77 
Rating Area Fair/Poor Health Status -66.84* 
Democratic Governor -14.95*** 
Prior Approval on Rate Review -13.71*** 
Mean Lowest Premiums Pre-ACA 0.37*** 
Medicaid Physician Fee Index 21.27*** 
State Recommended EHB 15.52*** 
Medicaid Expansion 4.88 
Constant 184.55*** 
  
R2 0.6315 
N 2004 
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 19: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 5-FFC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -17.90*** -19.12*** -3.44 -17.15*** 
2-SSC -25.81*** -30.73*** -27.99*** -35.12*** 
3-PSC -1.49 -2.71 1.54 -6.14 
4-FSC -4.31 -11.01** -7.93 -8.33 
     
R2 0.6315    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 20: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 4-FSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -13.59* -8.11 4.49 -8.81 
2-SSC -21.49** -19.72** -20.07* -26.78*** 
3-PSC 2.82 8.30 9.47 2.19 
5-FFC 4.31 11.01** 7.93 8.33 
     
R2 0.6315    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 21: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 3-PSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA -16.41** -16.31** -4.98 -11.01* 
2-SSC -24.32*** -28.09*** -29.54*** -28.98*** 
4-FSC -2.82 -8.30 -9.47 -2.19 
5-FFC 1.49 2.71 -1.54 6.14 
     
R2 0.6315    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 22: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 2-SSC 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
1-SSA 7.90 11.61 24.56*** 17.96** 
3-PSC 24.32*** 28.09*** 29.54*** 28.98*** 
4-FSC 21.49*** 19.72** 20.07** 26.78*** 
5-FFC 25.81*** 30.73*** 27.99*** 35.12*** 
     
R2 0.6315    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 23: Model 2 Pooled Regression, Impact of State Engagement in Exchanges on 
Premiums Compared To 1-SSA 
 
Lowest Cost 
Bronze Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Second 
Lowest Cost 
Silver Plans 
Lowest Cost 
Gold Plans 
2-SSC -7.90 -11.61 -24.56*** -17.96** 
3-PSC 16.41** 16.31** 4.98 11.01* 
4-FSC 13.59* 8.11 -4.49 8.81 
5-FFC 17.90*** 19.12*** 3.44 17.15*** 
     
R2 0.6315    
N 2004    
Legend: * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
